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By Amy J. Schmitz
about ODR and the fate of consumers on the Internet. 
Consumers assume that businesses will always have 
the power —as if bad consumer experiences are inevi-
table. Some also assume that merchants who provide 
internal ODR systems for solving eCommerce claims 
must have a hidden agenda, or unfair disadvantage. 
Such assumed negativity regarding ODR is wrong. 
The Internet undoubtedly generates vulnerabilities for 
consumers, but it also creates opportunities for con-
sumer empowerment. The time is right to take advan-
tage of those opportunities. Merchants, payments 
providers, consumer groups, regulators, and other poli-
cymakers must join forces in addressing this challenge 
by creating a unified ODR system that provides fast 
and fair resolutions worldwide. Aiming to catalyze this 
effort, this essay will address design caveats and provide 
criteria for creating a just ODR system.
ADDRESSING ASYMMETRIES
There are many considerations for designing a 
just ODR system. The first is to address asymmetries 
that tilt the playing field in favor of merchants. 
Often commentators and policymakers discuss these 
asymmetries in terms of “repeat player advantages,” 
which have been documented and debated for quite 
some time with respect to arbitration, for example. 
This focuses on the fact that merchants generally are 
repeat players in dispute resolution processes, and 
thus gather information that gives them an advantage 
in resolving disputes toward their favor. Furthermore, 
these repeat player merchants usually have greater 
legal and financial resources than consumers, again 
causing the system to tilt in the merchants’ favor.
Said another way, merchants and consumers fare 
differently due to the volume asymmetry. Consider 
that most consumers only experience one or two 
problems with their eCommerce purchases in a given 
year, and rarely (if ever) do consumers experience 
problems with the same merchant. That means that 
even if a consumer experiences multiple purchase 
problems, it is likely that the consumer will have to 
navigate different complaints processes for each store 
or merchant. They may call some companies seeking 
remedies, file claims with ODR systems where possi-
ble, write emails to other companies, etc. Consumers 
therefore gain no repeat player advantages with any 
one complaint system.
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A 
great deal of discussion focuses on how arbitra-
tion and similar private dispute resolution harms 
consumers, and how businesses seek ways to avoid 
helping consumers.1 It is often assumed that 
companies and consumers are on opposing “teams.” 
In reality, however, consumers and companies enjoy 
more commonalities than contradictions. Both ben-
efit when deals go well and disputes are resolved 
quickly and cheaply. 
The problem is that face-to-face dispute reso-
lution can be costly in terms of time and money. 
Furthermore, getting lawyers involved may inspire 
gamesmanship and adversarial antics aimed to protect 
one’s reputation for staying “strong” and refusing to 
settle or admit wrongdoing. The solution is a well-
designed online dispute resolution (ODR) system 
that harnesses business and consumer commonalities, 
and creates a win-win for all stakeholders in eCom-
merce disputes.2 
That is not to say that ODR is the “end-all-be-
all” for eCommerce disputes. All ODR is not fair and 
efficient. In fact, it is tempting to slip into cynicism 
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In contrast, sellers experience problems on 
approximately 1 to 3 percent of their overall sales 
volume. If a seller sells 100 items a month, that 
means 12 to 36 disputes a year. If they sell 1000 items 
a month, that is 120 to 360 disputes a year. As sales 
volume increases, so do disputes. This volume asym-
metry gives the seller a significant advantage. Sellers 
are the proverbial “repeat player.” The merchants 
learn the system, and can afford to hire the requisite 
legal assistance to help them navigate complaints 
toward their favor. 
This relates to the information asymmetry. The 
seller (or the customer service employees working for 
the seller) quickly develops a lot of expertise about 
how the resolution process works. Sellers know what 
policies govern the outcomes rendered by the pro-
cess, and they know what evidence will likely sway 
a decisionmaker. The consumer likely enters the 
process with no awareness of how it works, while the 
merchant enters the process with a long track record 
of lessons learned. That also means that the consumer 
must learn the rules as they navigate the process, 
while the seller already knows how everything is 
going to proceed. 
The third asymmetry is the resource asymme-
try. Sellers have the resources to support a long and 
extended resolution process, while consumers do not. 
Sellers also have the funds to retain counsel to deal 
with larger claims, and to apply policies for “paying 
off” the squeaky wheels, or highly valued consumers 
due to their zip codes or history for large purchases. 
However, such policies may harm those with the low-
est incomes—essentially the consumer “have-nots.”3 
These consumers are on their own in navigating 
remedy processes and seeking any sort of relief. That 
means that a well-designed and fair redress process 
must be built for any user, regardless of education 
or resources. It must require no legal representation, 
understanding of policies and precedents, or presenta-
tion of evidence.
Accordingly, there is danger that volume, infor-
mation and resource asymmetries will converge to tilt 
any ODR processes to favor merchants. However, we 
can design a resolution process that simultaneously 
compensates for the repeat player advantage and 
the three types of asymmetry. The solution is to give 
consumers control, while providing extensive help 
content and algorithmic support to counteract the 
information asymmetry that sellers enjoy. Control 
comes from simplicity. Consumers gain a sense of 
empowerment and control when they can easily 
navigate a resolution process without need for legal 
assistance or advanced education. In other words, 
online consumer redress processes must be very 
simple and straightforward for the consumer so that 
consumers are not disadvantaged by their lack of prior 
experience. 
Furthermore, algorithmic support addresses the 
information asymmetry by digesting data from prior 
cases and complaints, and suggesting fair resolutions. 
A well designed ODR system must therefore leverage 
information drawn from the experiences of thousands 
of other buyers. Armed with data regarding prior 
cases and resolutions, consumers will not be left “in 
the dark” navigating their way toward a resolution. 
Furthermore, system monitoring and external audit-
ing of the ODR process and any algorithms used 
should be added to catch repeat player problems when 
they arise. Indeed, it is easier to test ODR fairness 
than traditional processes due to the ease of system 
data collection and use of data auditing techniques.
SETTING A DOLLAR LIMIT
One of the major debates regarding UNCITRAL 
Working Group III on ODR focused on the intended 
scope of a global ODR system and the definition 
of Business-to-Consumer (B2C) verses Business-to-
Business (B2B) cases. Determing whether a buyer is a 
consumer or a buisness is not a simple matter. Some 
businesses go online to buy large amounts of goods to 
stock their brick-and-mortar stores, while other sole 
proprietors make very few small dollar purchases and 
feel like “little guys” in eCommerce. It also is difficult 
to tell whether a seller is a professional or a hobbyist. 
If a seller is posting homemade mittens out of her 
kitchen, is she a consumer or a professional seller? At 
what point does one switch from being a consumer to 
being a merchant, and should it matter for determin-
ing the scope of a global ODR system?
Accordingly, it seems wise to bypass the debate 
regarding what qualifies as a “business” to define 
scope for a global ODR system. Instead, the best way 
to handle the issue is to simply set a dollar limit for 
the system, and include all transactions under that 
limit regardless of whether one would view them as 
B2C or B2B. This value may be different in different 
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geographies, and it will change over time. Of course, 
the meaning of “low value” claims comes with its own 
difficulties, but it is much easier to tackle. It is none-
theless possible to set an amount, such as $1,000 and 
other currency equivalents, as a starting point. The 
amount could rise to $5,000 and currency equiva-
lents, as $5,000 often is used for small claims courts 
in the United States. This would be a better starting 
point than getting hung up on the question of how 
to effectively triage cases into B2C and B2B buckets. 
BYPASSING THE BINDING VS. 
NON-BINDING DEBATE
The question of whether ODR systems should 
deliver binding outcomes has complicated many of 
the discussions around consumer redress. Indeed, 
dissention remains regarding the legitimacy of any 
binding ODR for resolution of B2C claims. There 
are strong arguments for evaluative approaches: 
Evaluative outcomes can provide 100 percent closure 
and can be extremely efficient to deliver at volume. 
Some parties also desire an evaluative determina-
tion in order to know whether they are “right.” 
Furthermore, parties gain assured access to remedies 
from final determinations. This gives disputants an 
incentive to put forth all their evidence, not holding 
facts back for future litigation, as may occur in non-
binding facilitative processes.
That said, policymakers, scholars, and consumer 
representatives have criticized binding arbitration 
in face-to-face consumer processes. They argue that 
pre-dispute binding arbitration clauses undermine 
valid consent and the enforcement of statutory con-
sumer protections and other public rights. Many legal 
jurisdictions in Europe, for example, forbid the use of 
pre-dispute binding arbitration clauses in consumer 
transactions. They often reserve evaluative deci-
sion making only for public bodies, such as Ombuds 
Offices or Consumer Courts. In these geographies, it 
would not be legal to require ODR outcomes to be 
binding on consumers.
It should be noted that there are ways to deliver 
evaluative outcomes in a manner that abides by due 
process and fairness standards. For example, increas-
ing transparency and adding external audits assist 
fairness of binding processes. Evaluative determina-
tions could be published on a central portal after 
appropriate redaction of private information. This 
portal could be easily searchable, and allow consum-
ers and consumer advocates to learn about recently 
resolved cases. Although some companies may be 
uncomfortable with such transparency, others would 
welcome opportunity to garner goodwill and com-
petitive differentiation by complying with consumer 
protections and providing remedies to deserving 
consumers. 
Ultimately, however, consumers should have free 
choice. They should not be compelled to abide by a 
binding private resolution without full information 
to weigh the benefits and costs. Consumers should 
retain the right to seek public redress. Therefore, 
ODR systems should not block access to the courts for 
consumers. But if the systems are well designed, they 
will resolve 99.99 percent of consumer cases without 
need for judicial redress. Moreover, the process would 
expand access to any remedies, since most low dollar 
consumer claims would never go to court anyway. 
Consumers often are simply left with no recourse 
because the costs of pursuing claims outweigh any 
likely redress. A free or cheap ODR process would 
therefore open avenues to remedies, and advance 
consumer protection.
DEALING WITH MASS CLAIMS
Isolating claims in private redress systems pre-
vents the public from learning about major consumer 
protection issues. That is a major criticism of arbitra-
tion as it currently operates. If every matter is viewed 
as a single case, the onus always is on the complainant 
to report the incident in order to get their particular 
situation addressed. Complainants often do not have 
the full picture, as they only know their particular 
experience. This makes it very difficult to connect 
the dots to identify more systemic problems. 
Advocates for mass claim processes such as class 
actions argue that resolution processes that require 
each aggrieved consumer to file an individual case 
will inevitably under-report problems because some 
percentage of consumers will not bother to report 
their issues. This means that the full extent of the 
situation will not be remedied. Class actions, they 
argue, are the only means for bringing justice to indi-
viduals with low dollar claims and shedding light on 
the full scope of the problem to be resolved.
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These criticisms have merit, and class actions 
can be very powerful. Effective ODR design, however, 
can address transparency and allow for new means of 
consumer protection without the costs and drawbacks 
of class actions. One potential approach can be drawn 
from Consumer Ombuds offices in the European 
Union. European countries do not have class actions 
as we do in the United States; but they are com-
mitted to providing strong consumer protection. A 
global ODR system can borrow from their design by 
including a tripwire-like mechanism. The tripwire is 
triggered when a certain number of cases are filed that 
fit the same fact pattern. 
To some extent, this is happening in the United 
States with the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau (CFPB). As consumers report issues in the 
CFPB’s complaint portal, staffers with the CFPB look 
for patterns in the reports. If enough similar reports 
are filed, the tripwire is activated, and the CFPB will 
notify the business and require them to do an investi-
gation to see how many consumers might have been 
similarly affected. 
It would be very easy to build in such a tripwire for 
a global ODR system. Resolutions always should start 
at the individual case level, but effective data col-
lection can enable pattern detection algorithms that 
make it easier to detect more systemic issues. Some 
companies may dislike this idea, as it allows regulators 
to “catch” bad actors, but companies should embrace 
this idea. It would allow them to learn of issues before 
they escalate into costly class claims. Moreover, the 
“good guys” benefit when the regulators and consum-
ers become aware of the “bad guy” practices and prod-
ucts. Next generation consumer redress systems must 
therefore provide resolutions that scale from single 
issues to mass claims within the same platform if they 
are to be truly effective.
BUILDING AN ODR TRUSTMARK
Merchant and sales platforms have been designed 
to rely heavily on seals or badges to indicate that a 
merchant is a trustworthy and reliable transaction 
partner. In many environments, these trustmarks, 
such as the Better Business Bureau “BBB” seal, or 
the TRUSTe logo, are a valuable tool for businesses 
looking to establish their legitimacy online. When an 
eCommerce merchant first enters a market or region, 
the consumers in that region may have no idea 
whether it is trustworthy. Trustmarks, particularly 
those issued by a well-respected organization or public 
agency, can help new customers feel that merchant is 
safe and competent.
Trustmarks are especially important for new 
merchants in providing consumers with some means 
to trust and make purchases. New merchants do not 
have ratings or track records. Accordingly, it would 
help consumers to feel comfortable buying from new 
or smaller vendors if these vendors have earned the 
right to post an ODR trustmark that signifies the 
vendor’s commitment to an ODR protocol for provid-
ing a fair redress mechanism for consumers to obtain 
remedies if purchases go awry. Furthermore, this trust-
mark would go beyond unmonitored review sites and 
clear a way toward justice in eCommerce. 
That is not to say all trustmarks have value. It 
can be extremely difficult for the organizations that 
issue the trustmarks to manually monitor the behav-
ior of all of the organizations who have opted into the 
trustmark program. Even the BBB has been criticized 
for not sufficiently monitoring businesses under its 
seal. In addition, other organizations may create fake 
or less stringent trustmarks, thereby impairing the 
value of all trustmarks and causing confusion as to 
which trustmarks are trustworthy. Eventually trust-
marks lose meaning and consumers no longer care 
about their existence when deciding where and how 
to make purchases. 
At the same time, some argue that trustmarks 
are unnecessary due to review sites such as Yelp and 
TripAdvisor, and purchaser reviews on merchant sites 
such as Amazon. The argument is that because these 
sites aggregate information from thousands of users, 
the four or five star rating of a merchant can be trusted 
as a good indicator of their reliability. The problem 
is that these sites also have lost credibility due to 
“flogging,” or posting fake blogs and reviews lauding 
products and services. Merchants also hire individu-
als to post fake reviews touting their own businesses 
and/or criticizing competitors. Furthermore, these 
reviews generally are unmonitored and their verac-
ity is suspect. Deciphering reviews also is difficult 
because they rely on the subjective thoughts of the 
poster. This makes reviews a poor stand-in for more 
thorough external performance auditing, leaving con-
sumers even more vulnerable to misleading informa-
tion and bad experiences.
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Accordingly, a well-conceived and monitored 
trustmark system would be beneficial for building an 
ODR system. There could be one unifying trustmark 
that earns respect through proper creation. Private 
entities could work in collaboration with govern-
ment regulators and other external auditors to ensure 
that the trustmark system is ethically administered. 
Specifically, merchants would earn the right to post 
the trustmark by agreeing to follow prescribed ODR 
standards of speed, fairness, and accountability. A 
public/private consortium would then monitor the 
system. A certain amount of this work could be done 
digitally with algorithms that catch patterns or lack 
of response, but there also would be some costs from 
human monitoring. Small subscription fees could 
help cover these costs.
SYNTHESIZING DESIGN 
CRITERIA
The challenge now is to take these observations 
and distill them into a plan of action. The following is 
a nutshell meant to catalyze discussion and develop-
ment.4 Indeed, the time is ripe to bring global ODR 
to fruition.
FAST, FREE AND FAIR 
First and foremost, we know that consumers want 
fast and easy resolutions. Individuals have no desire or 
time to pick up the phone and wait on hold or waste 
time haggling over a fair solution. Consumers have 
endured that pain for far too long. Consumers also 
will run from any fees for using a process for simply 
getting what they were promised. ODR, therefore, 
must be simple to access, free to consumers, and easy 
to understand.
This also means that the initiation for the 
process should reside in exactly the same location 
where the transaction originally took place: on the 
merchant’s Web site. The consumer should be easily 
able to report an issue, and should get a solution as 
quickly as possible. Instant determinations would be 
best; failing that, however, a resolution in hours or 
days instead of weeks or months.
Online guides and wizards should be available to 
enable consumers to easily educate themselves about 
their rights, evidentiary obligations, procedural steps, 
and likely outcomes. Consumers must know exactly 
what they are getting into when they initiate the 
process. They must never feel surprised or misled by 
a procedural development that they did not know 
about prior to filing the case. 
Furthermore, consumers using the system should 
not fear retribution for filing a claim. Data collected 
should be scrubbed of personally identifying infor-
mation, and merchants should be prohibited from 
“punishing” consumers for filing to seek redress. The 
consumers that will use this process are likely to feel 
that they have been treated unfairly once, and that 
is the reason why they decided to try ODR. We must 
do everything in our power to ensure that they do 
not feel doubly mistreated by this redress design, and 
that it is as easy and straightforward as it can be, in 
order to ensure the consumer feels the process was 
fast and fair.
HIGHLY SCALABLE
This global ODR system should not simply ben-
efit consumers. It also must benefit merchants or they 
will never “sign on” and adopt the system. Scalability 
is therefore a must. Scalability makes ODR a 
problem-solver for merchants across the globe.
Merchants face an incredible volume of disputes 
through eCommerce (projected to be more than 
1 billion disputes per year in 2017 and beyond). This 
volume of disputes simply cannot be resolved through 
human powered resolution procedures. It is much too 
expensive for merchants to hire sufficient customer 
service representatives and lawyers to deal with all 
the disputes eCommerce generates. This makes algo-
rithms incredibly effective and efficient for resolving 
eCommerce disputes. For example, algorithms using 
data regarding similar disputes could help generate 
quick remedies and settlements. 
Critics of algorithms argue that computers should 
never decide disputes because they eliminate the 
compassion and empathy of in-person interactions. 
However, that ignores the fact eCommerce is gener-
ated online and over the Internet—by and through 
computers. Most, if not all, purchasers and merchants 
over the Internet do not care about personal connec-
tions. They simply want swift transactions and rem-
edies when purchases go wrong. Algorithms that are 
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carefully constructed and closely monitored have the 
power to provide the type of fast and fair resolutions 
consumers crave.
That said, not every case can be effectively 
resolved by algorithm. The ODR system must work 
like a filter, where algorithmic resolutions handle 
the easily resolvable cases. This would leave a much 
smaller volume that requires human attention. That 
means that algorithms will use data to suggest settle-
ments, thereby leading to resolutions of nearly all 
cases. Nonetheless, online mediators and arbitrators 
could handle the few cases left unresolved. Telephone 
and in-person assistance also could be available as a 
last resort.
This approach is the only way to make the 
system sustainable. Consider that most eCommerce 
purchases are under $100. It is very hard to imagine 
a human-powered resolution process that will be 
able to handle cases at that price point on a cost-
effective basis. Companies would have to spend 
exponential amounts to build up customer service, 
along with an abundance of mediators and arbitra-
tors to resolve all of these claims. An ODR process 
that handles most issues through algorithms would 
therefore save companies costs in dealing with 
complaints. Moreover, such ODR would be built to 
scale, thus helping solve the customer service prob-
lem and assisting merchants to retain happy and 
loyal customers.
SECURE
The daily news is filled with stories of scams and 
data privacy disasters. Consumers nonetheless are 
eager to continue making purchases online. In the 
process, however, they want to be sure that their pri-
vacy is respected. Consumers want to receive exactly 
what they were told they were going to get when they 
agreed to the transaction, and they do not want to be 
stuck with things without consent. They certainly do 
not want to learn that their data has been sold and 
used in improper ways.
This brings in security and privacy. Part of being 
treated with respect is a commitment to maintaining 
consumer privacy. Consumers know that businesses 
are tracking when they make online purchases, use 
store loyalty cards, or pay for goods or services using 
their credit and debit cards. Data brokers track 
spending habits, how long one lingers on a Web 
site, consumers’ online searching histories, family 
information, and even postings on social sites such 
as Facebook. Consumers may tolerate this data col-
lection if it is used to improve their shopping expe-
rience, but they are intolerant of businesses treating 
their private data like another product to be bought 
and sold.
This is especially true when seeking remedies 
and settlement. A global ODR process must therefore 
respect privacy and preclude any sale of collected 
data. Some data about claims and issues may be col-
lected, but it only should be used to improve the process 
and assist in predicting proper remedies based on similar 
cases. Again, that data must be scrubbed of person-
ally identifying information. Moreover, data security 
must be a central component of the system. The ODR 
platform must be encrypted—and certainly much 
safer than email. 
AMICABLY TONED
Tone is incredibly important. A global ODR 
system must set the right tone or it will fail at the 
outset. This is especially true given the variety of 
cultures and backgrounds of its users. Therefore, 
systems built under the presumption that all 
reported issues are fraud will generate frustration 
and inspire claims. The data shows that problems 
are inevitable, and the majority of them are resolv-
able through direct communication. Consumers 
and merchants want to have successful transac-
tions, and they can be trusted to do the right thing 
most of the time.
This means that an ODR system should provide 
guided communication flows that provide a proper 
mindset. If the language used within a redress flow 
presumes ill intent (e.g., filing a “fraud alert” instead 
of “reporting a problem”) then the users within that 
system similarly will assume that the other side is 
a bad actor that needs to be punished. The better 
approach is to provide simple flows starting with 
“item not received” or “item not as promised.” Factual 
flows from these basic starting points keep the com-
munications focused on finding a solution in good 
faith.
Ultimately, it is best when consumers and 
merchants can resolve a matter through mutual 
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agreement and direct communication. That is the 
best outcome for a reported problem. This brings us 
back to the binding/non-binding debate regarding 
arbitration noted above. When evaluative systems 
impose a punitive, victim-offender narrative on prob-
lems at the outset, one party always will leave the case 
feeling frustrated. Accordingly, ODR guided flows 
focused on facts and not judgment lead to the highest 
satisfaction.
CONSISTENT
An immediate concern regarding ODR is that 
it eventually will skew toward the repeat players, as 
noted above. Of course, as soon as a redress system 
is launched, potential users immediately test it. They 
may generate a barrage of cases and try out the dif-
ferent scenarios to see if they can find a seam in the 
design that they can exploit. Consider the individual 
who continually tries different scenarios in Turbotax 
hoping to lower one’s taxes.
Accordingly, it is of utmost importance that 
the global ODR system be designed to combat this 
type of gaming. When vulnerabilities or perverse 
incentives are discovered in the flow, they must 
be addressed quickly. As the system matures, and 
designers re-code, reconsider, and redraft policies, 
new opportunities emerge for the delicate power bal-
ance between participants to be negatively affected. 
This is especially problematic when the profit 
motive comes into play. Good intentions at launch 
can come unstuck over the years if the systems 
administrators pay too much attention to maximiz-
ing the revenue stream. This is a challenge for all 
redress systems, public or private, but private inter-
ests may be even more susceptible.
That is not to say that private companies should 
not play a vital role in creating ODR processes. 
Indeed, they are essential because only they are able 
to stay abreast of rapidly evolving developments 
in technology and the global eCommerce market-
place. But independent evaluators should play a role 
in ensuring the fairness of these privately created 
processes. 
This can begin with tripwires that notify public 
regulators and non-profit oversight organizations not 
only of large volumes of claims regarding the same 
products, but also when it appears that outcomes 
have become skewed. Once filings cross the specified 
threshold or indicate that outcomes may be skewed to 
favor a certain merchant, regulators may be automati-
cally notified of possible grounds for an investigation 
or enforcement action. Also, these tripwires may 
result in an automatic public notification to inform 
other consumers of a potential recurring problem. 
This type of automated action could be important 
especially to catch “gamers” and to alert the public of 
health or safety issues are at stake.
These automated notification systems also could 
ease companies’ overall dispute resolution costs 
by making the entire redress process more cost 
effective and efficient. The trust benefit obtained 
by participating businesses would provide more 
than enough economic benefit to justify participa-
tion. Furthermore, companies’ participation in the 
ODR process should help them avoid any potential 
enforcement actions and class claims, and the courts 
should view participation in externally audited 
third party resolution systems as a strong signal that 
companies are committed to treating their custom-
ers fairly. 
BENEFICIAL TRUSTMARK
As noted above, building a trustmark for ODR 
could be beneficial to companies and consumers. 
This trustmark should (a) communicate to buyers 
that this system is a safe and effective place for them 
to resolve purchase problems; (b) earn positive noto-
riety to set it apart from the morass of other redress 
schemes promoted across the Internet; and (c) be 
cross-culturally valid and appropriate in a wide vari-
ety of geographies.
Ideally the trustmark should create an affiliative 
halo from participation if respected public and private 
entities contribute their reputations to the admin-
istration and management of the system. Quality 
merchants will be eager to associate themselves with 
leading consumer protection and advocacy organiza-
tions, even if participation does generate additional 
responsibilities. The goal is to build a reliable resolu-
tion process that consumers will come to understand 
and utilize, and businesses will realize a trust benefit 
from their participation. 
Such an ODR trustmark should not be a goal 
in itself. Instead, it should be valuable to both 
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consumers and merchants. It should be the backbone 
of a new ODR opt-in mechanism to provide buyers a 
tool that they can utilize should a purchase go wrong. 
At the same time, it should give merchants credibil-
ity, and help them obtain and retain loyal customers. 
Accordingly, the program must include mechanisms 
to throw out underperforming merchants from the 
program. The credibility of the system is dependent 
on strict enforcement of the merchant guidelines. 
If businesses repeatedly flout the rules and do not 
resolve buyer complaints, yet remain in the system, 
the trustworthiness of the overall program may be 
irreparably damaged.
ENFORCEABLE
Any ODR system that leaves merchants free to 
ignore resolutions is useless. Currently, some online 
marketplaces have not done the work required to 
enable effective enforcement of outcomes. For exam-
ple, some classified sites do not enable buyers and sell-
ers to hold their transaction partners accountable for 
performance once the transaction is complete. Users 
may have no fixed username or account, and no con-
crete way of getting a remedy once payment is made. 
The consumer may know nothing tangible about the 
merchant, and may be unable to contact them with 
any questions or problems. 
For example, if an online marketplace provides 
only a disposable forwarding email address for a 
transaction partner, and the parties make a cash deal 
in person, there is no way to resolve a later problem. 
Consider the buyer who pays $500 in cash for a lap-
top, meeting the seller in a parking lot, and then later 
discovers the laptop is completely non-functional. 
The buyer has no way to contact the seller to ask a 
question, and there is no way to reverse the payment 
made in cash. 
In contrast, an ODR system must be built to 
allow for tracking and enforcement. Delivering reso-
lutions to consumers that must then find ways to 
enforce is not an effective design. Enforcement 
should be automated, effective, and integrated into 
the transaction from inception. Merchant contacts 
must be tested and tracking must be part of the ODR 
system. Furthermore, merchants who fail to abide by 
resolutions and settlements must lose ability to post 
the trustmark. Ultimately, they must be eliminated 
from the program, thus harming their ability to gather 
and retain customers.
ADAPTABLE
One of the key attributes of ODR is its adapt-
ability. Any computer coder or software designer will 
tell you that no solution is perfect on the first try. 
No matter how much research, planning, and testing 
one does in advance of bringing a system live, adjust-
ments always are required. Furthermore, regardless 
of whether a system seems to be working at launch, 
conditions always are changing, which requires any 
platform to be able to evolve and adjust if it is to 
remain effective over the longer term. 
A global ODR system must therefore be ready to 
adapt and change. This will be fueled by scalability, 
and the high volume caseloads in eCommerce dis-
putes. The system itself will generate a lot of data, and 
effective systems designers will then be able to analyze 
the data to learn from that flow and continuously 
improve the system over time. ODR systems also 
have the advantage of being able to engage problems 
much earlier in the lifecycle of the issue, and early 
resolutions are the most effective. ODR systems also 
can offer valuable insights upstream of disputes, so 
that the transaction environment itself may be able 
to adjust to prevent later misunderstandings that 
can turn into problems and disputes. This discipline 
of continuous improvement and learning should be 
integrated into the ODR system’s design from incep-
tion to ensure continued relevance and effectiveness.
CONCLUSION
It is not simple to design and build a global 
ODR system that can handle high volumes, cross 
cultures, and continuously improve. Key debates 
around asymmetries, scope, consent, class claims, 
and trust have stymied development of such a system 
since UNCITRAL Working Group III ended in 2016. 
These debates, however, can be addressed. There are 
ways to design an ODR system that will be effective 
over the long term. This article aimed to crystalize 
key considerations and lay out design criteria to cre-
ate a foundation for this system. The challenge now is 
to engage private and public entities to take the lead 
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and work with merchants and consumers on a global 
level to take these observations and craft a systems 
design that integrates them into an implementable 
ODR solution for global eCommerce claims.
NOTES
1. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Final Rule, Arbitration, 
Nov. 1, 2017, at https://www.consumerfinance.gov/policy-compliance/
rulemaking/final-rules/arbitration-agreements. On Nov. 1, 2017, the 
President signed a joint resolution passed by Congress disapproving 
the Arbitration Agreements Rule under the Congressional Review 
Act (CRA). This essentially overturned the CFPB’s proposed rule 
that would have precluded enforcement of predispute arbitration 
clauses in consumer financial product and service agreements 
where it would hinder class actions.
2. See generally, Amy J. Schmitz & Colin Rule, The New 
Handshake: Online Dispute Resolution And The Future Of 
Consumer Protection (2017). Again, the ideas in this essay are 
further distilled and explored in this book. 
3. Amy J. Schmitz, Secret Consumer Scores and Segmentations: 
Separating Consumer “Haves” from “Have-Nots,” 2014 Mich. St. L. 
Rev. 1411-1473 (2015).
4. These ideas are further explored in my book with Colin Rule, 
supra n.2.
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INTRODUCTION 3
On January 25, 2012, the European Commission 
(the Commission) proposed a reform of the EU’s 
data protection rules by drafting the General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR) in order to strengthen 
online data protection rights and boost Europe’s 
digital economy. It was also done to adapt to tech-
nological advancements that had taken place in the 
previous decade, following the introduction of the 
Data Protection Directive.4 While the provisions of 
the GDPR build upon those established under the 
Data Protection Directive, the rules under the GDPR 
are more stringent5 and hold a wider scope.6 The reac-
tions to the GDPR have been mixed. Some scholars7 
saw it as a welcome development, however others8 
have raised concerns. 
The right to data portability in the GDPR will 
require businesses to ensure that they can hand over 
personal data provided by an individual9 in a usable 
and transferable format. The preamble of the GDPR 
demonstrates that the right to data portability will be 
applicable to cloud computing, Web services, smart-
phone systems and other automated data processing 
systems.10 The right to data portability will apply to 
a wide range of areas such as social media, search 
engines, photo storage, email and online shops. It 
will be equally applicable to banks, pharmaceutical 
companies, energy providers, airlines—even small 
businesses such as pizza shops or tailors if they are data 
controllers and deal with personal data.
The final text of the GDPR was agreed to in the 
trilogue between the European Council, Parliament 
and Commission on December 15, 2015, and pub-
lished on May 4, 2016 in the Official Journal of the 
European Union.11 After a two-year transition period, 
the GDPR will be binding on all member states from 
May 25, 2018.
The right to data portability is contained under 
Article 20 of the GDPR. It can be seen as an exten-
sion of an individual’s right of access under Article 15 
of the GDPR.12 It has two key elements: (1) the right 
of the data subject to obtain a copy of personal data 
from the data controller; and (2) the right to transfer 
that data from one data controller to another. The 
text of the GDPR arguably limits the scope of the 
right to data portability and contained some ambi-
guities. Following an open public consultation, which 
ran through the end of January 2017, on April 5, 
2017, the Article 29 Working Party13 approved a 
revised and substantive guidance (hereinafter referred 
to as the 2017 revised guidelines on data portability) 
clarifying some of the ambiguities with regards to the 
right to data portability.14
This article examines the right to data portabil-
ity under the GDPR to establish whether any lessons 
can be drawn from the EU experience, particularly 
for the United States. This article critically analyzes 
the issues raised by Article 20 of the GDPR and 
potential enforcement problems. It also gives an 
overview of the state of data portability in the United 
States and provides lessons to be learned from the EU 
experience.
CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE 
RIGHT TO DATA PORTABILITY—
KEY ISSUES IN THE GDPR 15
LIMITATIONS ON DATA GENERATED 
BY THE DATA CONTROLLER
Article 20 of the GDPR only applies to data 
provided by the data subject. The Article 29 Working 
Party published a summary of discussions that took 
place at the Fablab Workshop July 26, 2016.16 It 
gave a good overview of key issues in relation to data 
portability. 
In the context of data portability, Article 29 
Working Party highlighted the importance of clarify-
ing what is meant by data that has been provided by 
the data subject, as a narrow interpretation of per-
sonal data would result in fewer benefits for individu-
als while a very wide interpretation of it would be a 
concern for data controllers.17 
As mentioned by Graef et al, the wording of 
Article 20 of the GDPR does not clarify whether the 
data that has been generated by the service provider 
for statistical and analytical purposes, such as online 
reputations, could be subject to data portability 
or not.18 
As pointed out by Graef et al,19 in an auction 
Web site such as eBay the contact information and 
the advertisements are provided by the seller (data 
subject) himself but the provider adds feedback 
The Right to Data Portability
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scores to the seller’s profile and these form part of 
the reputation that a seller has built on. Hence, a 
literal interpretation of the adopted text would only 
allow the users to move their personal information 
to another auction site while not being able to move 
their ratings and reputation to another auction site as 
the latter is provided by the service provider. For an 
online user it is crucial to show that he/she has built a 
good reputation when he/she moves on to a different 
platform. Without moving this reputation, it is highly 
unlikely that the seller would attract new buyers in a 
new platform. Ultimately, this can hinder users from 
moving to another platform. 
The April 2017 revised guidelines on the right to 
data portability offer some helpful clarification with 
regards to the above-mentioned ambiguity by stipulat-
ing that data provided by the individual should include 
“the personal data that are observed from the activities 
of users such as raw data processed by a smart meter or 
other types of connected objects, activity logs, history 
of Web site usage or search activities.”20 In other words, 
according to the revised guidelines on the right to data 
portability the term provided by data subject includes 
the data that result from the observation of an indi-
viduals’ behavior but it does not cover ‘inferred’ data 
resulting from the subsequent analysis of that behavior 
by the data controller.21 Hence it could be said that 
Article 29 Working Party takes a broader interpreta-
tion of personal data, which is a welcome interpreta-
tion in terms of extending the scope of data portability 
in the EU member states.
In the context of Graeff’s example, buyer/seller 
ratings on eBay would fall within the scope of 
observed data, which would be portable from one 
controller to another, while an average of these 
scores calculated by the data controller (processor), 
would not. 
The Article 29 Working Party also clarifies that 
meta data that is needed to meet the data subjects’ 
objective, to move data from one service to another, 
falls within the scope of Article 20 of the GDPR.22 
As an example, the right to data portability would 
require a data controller to not only transfer the 
emails sent and received by the data subject but 
also other relevant information such as timestamp 
information and other information showing whether 
emails have been read or not.
The clarifications in the revised guidelines on 
data portability go a long way in meeting the need for 
clarification. Nevertheless, it will be interesting to see 
whether data controllers will find ways of circumvent-
ing the revised guidelines in order to refuse to transfer 
data to another controller and it will be important to 
monitor any potential problems in order to address 
them in the future.
PRIVACY RIGHTS OF THIRD PARTIES
Another limitation of the right to data porta-
bility concerns the privacy rights of third parties. 
As noted by Engels, allowing one user to transfer a 
second user’s information to another platform may 
violate the privacy rights of a second user.23 For exam-
ple, when several people appear in a photograph on 
Facebook, even if one data subject wants to import it 
to another social networking platform, this cannot be 
done, as it would impact privacy and data portability 
rights of other individuals appearing in that picture. 
Another example is a bank transfer with information 
pertaining to both buyer and seller. This implication 
seems to have been taken into account by the legisla-
tors as paragraph 4 of Article 20 GDPR states that the 
right to data shall not adversely affect the rights and 
freedoms of others. 
The revised guidelines by the Article 29 Working 
Party make it clear that even if the requested data 
might have an impact on the privacy rights of third 
parties this does not stop it from being transferred to 
another controller.
Their proposed solution to deal with potential 
shortcomings is two–pronged. First, “The processing 
operations initiated by the data subject in the con-
text of personal activity that concern and potentially 
impact third parties remain under his or her responsi-
bility, to the extent that such processing is not, in any 
manner, decided by the data controller.”24 In other 
words, according to the April 2017 Guidelines on 
the right to data portability, if the data relates to the 
person making the request as well as third parties, it 
is the responsibility of the person making the request 
to ensure that data protection right of third parties 
are respected.
Second, the revised guidance asserts that “the 
rights and freedoms of third parties will not be 
respected if the new data controller uses their personal 
data for purposes other than to deliver a service to the 
data subject who has ported the data.25” For instance, 
J O U R N A L  O F  I N T E R N E T  L A W  J a n u a r y  2 0 1 8
14
if the new data controller uses the data of third parties 
for direct marketing purposes, it would be contrary to 
the revised guidelines on data portability.
TECHNICAL FEASIBILITY OF DATA 
TRANSFER
A significant challenge for the enforcement of 
the right to data portability concerns the “technical 
feasibility” sought for the data portability across the 
platforms. Arguably, what is technically feasible for 
one data controller might not be technically feasible 
for another data controller. Given the wording of 
Article 20(2) of the GDPR it is likely that some 
data controllers will contend that such a transfer is 
technically infeasible. As a result of this wording the 
transfer of data may be undermined and overlooked 
by data controllers. As there is no reference to the 
Commission’s authority to specify the electronic for-
mat necessary for data portability in the GDPR, col-
laboration among market players is crucial in devising 
industry norms and standards. 
In its revised guidelines issued on April 2017, the 
Article 29 Working Party offers valuable clarification 
with regards to the notion of technical feasibility and 
controller to controller transfer.
Article 29 Working Party states that “where no 
formats are in common use for a given industry or 
given context, data controllers should provide per-
sonal data using commonly used open formats (e.g., 
XML, JSON, CSV) along with useful metadata at the 
best possible level of granularity, while maintaining a 
high level of abstraction.”26
As regards “technically feasible” Article 29 
Working Party holds that “… direct transmission from 
one data controller to another could … occur when 
communication between two systems is possible, in a 
secured way, and when the receiving system is tech-
nically in a position to receive the incoming data.”27 
This can be interpreted as there being no impediment 
to invest in new functionality where existing systems 
do not support controller-to-controller transfer.
In terms of enforcing direct controller-to-
controller portability it seems that the Article 29 
Working Party has chosen to rely on two mecha-
nisms to motivate direct transfer: (1) data subject 
pressure by empowering data subjects to demand an 
explanation as to why data controllers are unable to 
offer direct controller-to-controller portability;28 and 
(2) the administrative burden of repetitive data sub-
ject requests, where data subjects can be expected 
to demand usable data vis-à-vis a range of disparate 
systems.29 
Whether the pressure from data subjects to 
ensure direct controller-to-controller portability will 
prove effective, remains to be seen. It will be interest-
ing to see whether data controllers will come up with 
ways to circumvent data portability by suggesting that 
such transfer is not technically feasible, when it is in 
fact possible.
A stricter requirement for direct controller-
to-controller transfer could still turn out to be a 
necessity, one that in a few years with open Web 
technologies will seem both more reasonable and 
more feasible. 
DISPROPORTIONATE COSTS AND 
EFFORTS 
Forcing data controllers to transfer personal data 
may result in disproportionate costs and efforts.
Article 20 of the GDPR requires an online ser-
vice to write specialized code—export-import module 
(EIM)—that will export data from that service and 
import it to another service. As noted by Swire and 
Lagos, many small and medium-sized companies do 
not have the resources to fully understand the GDPR, 
comply with it and write an EIM to move data to 
another provider.30
Neither the Commission nor other EU institu-
tions have presented any figures as to the cost of com-
plying with data portability requests. According to a 
study by Christensen et al, the GDPR reform would 
increase European small and medium-sized enter-
prises’ annual IT costs by between approximately 
€ 3.000 and € 7.200 depending on the industry the 
particular SME is operating in, representing between 
16 and 40 percent of their yearly average IT budgets.31 
It is not clear what percentage of this budget will be 
spent responding to data portability requests.
Swire and Lagos also support this point and argue 
that the GDPR would impose substantial costs on 
suppliers of software and apps.32
While such costs may not be significant for large 
companies, the requirement is likely to create prob-
lems for small and medium-sized companies. It must 
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be noted that complying with the GDPR should not 
to be taken lightly due to the heavy fines associated 
with failing to do so. According to Article 83(5) 
of the GDPR, a data controller that fails to comply 
with data portability provisions in the GDPR will 
incur administrative fines up to 20 million EUR or 
in case of an undertaking up to 4 percent of the total 
worldwide annual turnover of the preceding year, 
whichever is greater.
The issue of disproportionate costs also was raised 
in December 2015 by Baroness Neville Rolfe, the 
United Kingdom’s parliamentary Under-Secretary of 
State for the Department for Business, Innovation 
and Skills. She stated that data portability rules 
designed to enable consumers to move their data from 
one platform to another should not be too costly as 
they can serve as an entry barrier into markets, and 
this might have an adverse effect on innovation and 
competition.33
The Article 29 Working Party, however, does 
make it clear in the guidelines that the role of being 
data controller in the European Union moving for-
ward should be considered a normal cost of doing 
business along the lines of accounting, insurance, 
and other unavoidable costs. The Article 29 Working 
Party explicitly holds that the overall system imple-
mentation costs cannot “be used to justify a refusal 
to answer portability requests.”34 Time will show 
whether dealing with data portability requests will be 
too costly for businesses or whether these costs could 
be seen as an ordinary cost of running a business as 
suggested by the Working Party.
PROPRIETARY INFORMATION AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
If the personal data that needs to be transferred 
contains valuable proprietary information and intel-
lectual property, this might discourage companies/
service providers from creating the proprietary infor-
mation in the first place.
The case of True Fit,35 an online digital service 
helping users of online clothing retailers such as 
House of Fraser to find the right cloth sizes for their 
shoppers, illustrates this point. The True Fit service 
asks shoppers to share a wide range of personal data 
such as height, weight, measurements, body type, and 
information such as what brand and size their favorite 
clothing comes from. Users share this information 
with True Fit, which then shares it with online retail-
ers. Arguably, if True Fit were to be required under the 
data portability provision to transfer this data to other 
retailers, its business model would become obsolete.
Recital 63 of the GDPR provides that the general 
right of access under Article 15 could be restricted if 
it adversely affects the rights and freedoms of oth-
ers, including trade secrets and intellectual property 
rights. As the right to data portability can be seen 
as an extension of the right of access, arguably the 
limitation mentioned in Recital 63 should be appli-
cable in the context of data portability requests. In 
other words, when faced with data portability requests 
companies, data controllers should be able to strip 
valuable data from the dataset if it adversely affects 
trade secrets and intellectual property. 
Nevertheless, neither recital 68 of the GDPR 
pertaining to the limitations of the right to data por-
tability, nor Article 20 of the GDPR specifically sug-
gests that the right to data portability can be limited 
if it adversely affects trade secrets and intellectual 
property. Hence there was a need for further clarifica-
tion as to whether the right to data portability might 
be restricted when it affects proprietary information 
and intellectual property rights.
If companies, such as True Fit, stop creating valu-
able services based on personal data, clearly this will 
have a stifling effect on innovation and consumer 
welfare. This would, ultimately, have an adverse 
effect on consumers who would be deprived of choice 
and useful products.
In the revised guidelines on the right to data por-
tability, the Article 29 Working Party provides some 
guidance with respect to the above and holds that 
“The right to data portability is not a right for an indi-
vidual to misuse the information in a way that could 
be qualified as an unfair practice or that would con-
stitute a violation of intellectual property rights.”36 
Furthermore in its guidance the Article 29 Working 
Party suggests that data controllers can provide the 
information requested in a form that does not release 
information covered by trade secrets and intellectual 
property rights.37 However it must be noted that this 
might not be always easy to implement. Hence there 
is definitely need for further guidance on this issue.
As seen above in the discussion of privacy rights 
of third parties, the Article 29 Working Party guide-
lines on data portability fail to offer protections for 
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current data controllers, while making it clear that 
the data subject, and the receiving data controller 
has every right to request data when the purpose is to 
provide a service to the data subject, regardless of the 
impact on the current data controller. 
In light of the above, it is unclear whether a third 
party data controller such as True Fit will be able to 
stop competitors, or current customers, from receiv-
ing information and use their service for free. Time 
will show if such firms and services will potentially 
suffer due to business models seemingly at odds with 
the GDPR, and what the cost of that will be to con-
sumers and to the economy. 
ENFORCEMENT ISSUES PERTAINING 
TO THE RIGHT TO DATA PORTABILITY
The main objective of the right to data portabil-
ity is to empower consumers so that they can get a 
copy of their electronic personal data, demand trans-
mission of their personal data to another provider 
and switch to other providers.38 Hence, the objective 
of the right to data portability overlaps with the 
objectives of other areas of law, e.g., competition law, 
consumer protection laws, and so forth. 
Similar to other data subject rights in the GDPR, 
data portability is a right, which needs to be invoked 
by the data subject and cannot be relied on by par-
ties such as small and medium sized businesses. 
For instance, a small business cannot demand data 
portability from its business bank but an individual 
can. This raises some problems regarding its legal and 
theoretical boundaries, as well as enforcement within 
the realm enshrined by the GDPR. 
Furthermore, there is no clarity as to whether 
users will make use of the right to data portability. 
In order to ensure that data subjects invoke the right 
effectively, data subjects need to be informed as to 
what this right entails. 
Hence, Article 29 Working Party should liaise 
with national data protection agencies in order to 
make sure the necessary investments are made in 
educating the public about their rights. As a mini-
mum, national data protection agencies should have 
information on their Web sites in plain and simple 
language explaining to users how they can approach 
the data controller for data portability requests and 
advise them on how to make a complaint if the data 
controller refuses to provide the data. Making a com-
plaint must be easy and the data subjects should not 
incur substantial costs or risks as this might discourage 
them from exercising their rights.
Furthermore, while the Article 29 Working Party 
guidelines do not refer to enhancing competition 
between services as an objective of data portability, 
several authors39 have suggested that competition 
law and provisions may contribute to the enforce-
ment of data portability legislation, in particular 
where the data controller is a dominant actor in a 
monopolistic market applying unfair restrictions on 
data portability. In this context, failure to offer direct 
controller-to-controller data portability without a 
valid and sensible reason could be seen as an abuse 
of a dominant position (or monopolization in the US 
context) and potentially be remedied by competition/
antitrust laws.
PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY RISKS
Security and privacy concerns arise when data is 
transferred from one data controller to another. Data 
can end up in the wrong hands if access is granted to 
the wrong person—an investigator making a pretext 
call, a conman engaged in identity theft, a hacker, 
or, in some instances, one family member in conflict 
with another.40 Ironically, interoperable solutions as 
suggested in the GDPR41 could aggravate security 
concerns at the expense of uniform rules and pro-
cesses in this context. Although not seen as the main 
cause of the security vulnerabilities, interoperability 
is regarded as one of the factors that increase the 
number of opportunities for security breaches and the 
potential fall-out from such breaches.42 Particularly 
for small and medium sized businesses (SME) with 
limited resources to invest in data security, this is a 
significant concern. 
The Article 29 Working Party arguably has not 
succeeded in offering more clarity as to what security 
standards are expected. It places the responsibility for 
data security squarely on the current data control-
ler, and suggests that risk mitigation measures may 
include “using additional authentication information, 
such as a shared secret, or another factor of authen-
tication, such as a onetime password; suspending or 
freezing the transmission if there is suspicion that the 
account has been compromised; in cases of a direct 
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transmission from a data controller to another data 
controller, authentication by mandate, such as token-
based authentications, should be used.”43
It can be argued that more detailed guidance 
should be offered, in particular as regards the extent 
of responsibility and mandate a data controller has in 
assessing the security of the receiving controller and 
the ability of the data subject to keep the requested 
data secure. While 20 years of financial records can be 
reasonably expected to be safe when controlled by a 
bank, they are likely to be a lot less safe if downloaded 
as a spread sheet to an unprotected smartphone. 
There are situations arguably where a data con-
troller should have the right to refuse data portabil-
ity due to concerns about security at the receiving 
end, hereunder uncertainty about the identity of the 
recipient and uncertainty surrounding the receiving 
data controller’s ability to protect personal and third 
party data.
DATA PORTABILITY IN THE 
UNITED STATES
Data portability has been a contentious issue in 
the United States as well. The United States does 
not have a uniform data protection law similar to 
the European Union and there is no single regulatory 
authority dedicated to overseeing data protection 
law in the United States. Concerning the right to 
access data collected by companies the United States 
relies on a patchwork of state and sector specific 
federal laws for credit agencies and data brokers.44 
Furthermore, there are many guidelines, developed by 
governmental agencies and industry groups that are 
part of self-regulatory guidelines and frameworks that 
are considered “best practices, which are not legally 
binding.45
In the United States, the Federal Trade 
Commission is the federal privacy regulator regarding 
consumer protection, which also is relevant for the 
online environment. 
Needles to say in the United States there is not a 
single provision that deals with the right to data por-
tability, which is comparable to the European Union. 
In the United States, data portability generally is seen 
as an access to information/data issue.
The 1996 Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIIPA) is the first and most 
wide ranging data portability initiative giving indi-
viduals the right to access personal health informa-
tion collected about them,46 delivered, e.g., on a 
storage device such as a USB drive. While offering 
the right to access data HIPAA does not currently 
address the need for controller–to–controller data 
portability. 
In 2010, former US President Obama launched a 
series of initiatives entitled “My Data initiatives” to 
ensure that US citizens has easy and secure access to 
their own personal data.47 
My Data Initiatives required the US Government 
to work together with the Federal Government, pub-
lic and private sector to facilitate US citizens’ access 
to their own personal data in a variety of sectors. As 
an example, Blue Button,48 a data healthcare initia-
tive, aimed to expand patients’ access to their medi-
cal records so that data subjects can track their own 
health records and health information, which also 
can be shared with doctors and specialists.49
The Green Button50 initiative allowed US citi-
zens to access their detailed household or building 
electricity records in order to facilitate virtual energy 
audits with a view to identify inefficiencies and save 
money by switching providers.51 
My Transcript52 initiative allows data portabil-
ity for the Internal Revenue Service and finally My 
Student53 Data initiative allows US students to down-
load information in relation to federal student grants 
and or loan information.
As pointed out by Macgillivray and Shambraugh, 
many private service providers have embraced data 
portability but there are still many other areas where 
data portability has not been required under US law 
and is not available in particular.54
On September 30, 2016, the Office of Science 
and Technology Policy (OSTP) asked various stake-
holders their thoughts on the potential benefits and 
drawbacks of increased data portability, the indus-
tries that would most benefit and be harmed by 
increased data portability, the specific steps the 
Federal Government and private companies and 
others might adopt to encourage greater data porta-
bility and the best practices in implementing data 
portability.55 
OSTP received 23 comments from several stake-
holders including companies, trade associations, 
advocacy groups, and individuals.56 Roughly half of 
the commentators limited their comments to health 
J O U R N A L  O F  I N T E R N E T  L A W  J a n u a r y  2 0 1 8
18
data and data portability pertaining to it. Many 
commenters praised the potential benefits of data 
portability for users. The respondents suggested that 
an increased data portability would improve financial 
awareness, increase user exploration of new services, 
ease the burden of backing up data, increase user con-
trol and user trust and lower barriers to entry for ser-
vices.57 Some commentators raised concerns as to the 
cost of data portability and the increasing complexity 
of data portability between services due to the lack of 
commonly agreed standards. 
Furthermore, some respondents suggested that 
data portability requirements might raise barriers to 
entry if they prove too be too burdensome to imple-
ment. One commentator summed up the views of 
several other commentators by stating that “porta-
bility should be incentivized but not mandated.”58 
Some commentators suggested that mandatory data 
portability rules would be inefficient, ineffective and 
be premature for rapidly developing industries and 
this might have a negative impact on innovation.59 
Finally,respondents suggested that the government 
could incentivize data portability by increasing con-
sumer awareness of it, leading by example or through 
encouraging interoperability and open standards, 
which would create the right environment for data 
portability.60 
As data continues to increase in value both to 
users and service providers, ensuring data portabil-
ity will become ever more crucial. From the above 
consultation, it is clear that data portability is quite 
desirable in the United States as well. Nevertheless 
based on the answers of the respondents it might be 
said that having a mandatory rule that applies across 
all sectors, is not very desirable for the industry stake-
holders. Sarah Holland from Google illustrates this 
point and states that “one size fits all” requirements in 
relation to data portability may promote consistency 
but it is an ineffective approach, as it might create 
artificial barriers to new services entering the market 
place.61 Arguably the right to data portability in the 
European Union and its successful implementation 
could prove useful in alleviating the concerns of the 
industry players. 
The OSTP consultation and the responses 
obtained from various stakeholders provide very use-
ful insights in relation to data portability in the US 
context. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the 
OSTP consultation received only 23 responses and 
the majority of the responses were obtained from 
industry players and associations. This shows that 
there is a need for a more extensive consultation and 
debate in the United States, which takes into account 
the views of diverse stakeholders particularly con-
sumers to have a more nuanced and more insightful 
review of the right to data portability.
CONCLUSION—WHAT LESSONS 
CAN BE DRAWN FROM THE EU 
EXPERIENCE
The objective of this article was to examine 
development of the right to data portability in the 
European Union under the GDPR with a view to 
establish whether any lessons can be drawn from the 
EU experience particularly for the United States.
As with the exception of sector specific regula-
tion for the Health Sector (HIPAA) and voluntary 
programs, there is as of yet no such thing as data por-
tability provision in the United States comparable to 
Article 20 of the GDPR. Hence a side-by-side com-
parison between the European Union and the United 
States is not relevant. 
The GDPR is unprecedented in geographical 
reach and in scope, far surpassing any equivalent leg-
islation anywhere in the world. The European Union 
currently is in uncharted territory as it sets out to 
break new ground in the area of data governance and 
in particular in the context of data portability rights 
for individuals. As such the European Union can offer 
the United States and other jurisdictions a wealth of 
insight as it explores ways of driving data portability 
across sectors.
First, the United States operates under the 
assumption that data portability is a choice for data 
controllers, not a right for data subjects. As such, 
much of the insight offered by the development of 
right to data portability under the GDPR has little 
relevance until the United States decides to see data 
portability as a fundamental right for data subjects. 
While the above-mentioned My Data Initiatives are 
commendable and certainly have driven innovation 
(although with limited adoption) in specific indus-
tries, they only apply to those industrial actors who 
see moral and economic sense in data portability 
and there is no penalty for not complying with these 
initiatives. In this regard, the first thing the United 
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States can take away from the data portability legisla-
tion in the GDPR may be as simple as: In the near 
future some form of legislation that comprises a right 
to data portability at federal level which applies to 
all industries and all firms, not just to a select few, 
is required. Such legislation does not need to be as 
rigid as the GDPR and can be shaped by taking into 
account the views of all relevant stakeholders includ-
ing industry players and consumers.
Second, if and when the United States eventu-
ally decides to catch up and adopt data protection 
legislation, which includes a right to data portability 
they will benefit from second mover advantage, being 
able to walk in the steps of the European Union 
where advantageous, while avoiding known pitfalls. 
The GDPR is far from being perfect and arguably 
still a work in progress however the United States 
and other jurisdictions definitely will benefit from 
following the European discourse with regards to the 
definition of data observed by the data subject, the 
privacy rights of third parties, the possible need for 
enforcement pertaining to direct transfers between 
data controllers, the treatment of proprietary infor-
mation and intellectual property rights, privacy and 
data security risks in transferring information in order 
to draw lessons.
Third, the United States probably will ben-
efit from observing the agile process with which the 
GDPR, and maybe Article 20 in particular, has seen 
the light of day. The GDPR deals with new techno-
logical realities in fast moving markets. To expect 
perfection from the GDPR would be unrealistic. The 
combination of the GDPR combined with guidelines 
seems to be working very well in this context, offer-
ing a reasonably high degree of predictability in an 
emergent environment. 
As the article demonstrates, the United States 
barely has started addressing data portability; nev-
ertheless US firms will have to comply with the 
requirements of the GDPR in the European Union as 
of May 2018. While the main purpose of the GDPR 
is to give EU citizens control over their personal data, 
it has an extra territorial reach. The GDPR applies to 
any company that operates in the European Union. 
Hence a large amount of US businesses including 
Google, Facebook, Microsoft that collect data from 
EU data subjects need to comply with the GDPR to 
avoid hefty fines. In this respect, it is likely that the 
United States will soon have to engage with the need 
for convergence in global data protection and more 
specifically data portability policy.
For the European Union and the United States, 
important research themes are emerging. In the con-
text of this article, three themes stand out.
First, in order to ensure successful enforcement of 
data portability there is a need to monitor and analyze 
the reasons offered by data controllers for refusal to 
comply with data portability requests, in particular 
relating to direct transfer between data control-
lers. This way, future guidelines can be adopted to 
address issues that hinder controller to controller data 
portability.
Second, interdisciplinary research is needed to 
ascertain the economic effects of data portability 
under the GDPR. As mentioned by several com-
mentators,62 personal data is the new oil. Hence 
legislating how an individual’s personal data should 
be made available to other parties has wide ranging 
consequences and such legislation should be treated 
very cautiously. It is important to ascertain to what 
degree the data portability provision under Article 
20 of the GDPR drives innovation, economic growth 
and consumer welfare, delivering on the promise of 
the European Digital Economy.
Finally, it is inspiring to see the results achieved 
by the US My Data initiatives such as Green Button. 
In this respect, the European Union would clearly 
benefit from research into what the United States 
gets right, in particular with reference to driving 
innovation and economic growth through construc-
tive and transparent engagement with industry.
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